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Abstract 
The present paper proposes a conceptual method for implementing a distributed repository for X.509 Attribute Certificates in a 
Privilege Management Infrastructure. It describes the idea behind this kind of repository, the security advantages of having a 
distributed repository, problems and access methods, and finally the techniques used to store and access the attribute certificates 
for validation by the requesting clients. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most engaging aspects in managing distributed systems is the complexity of security management, 
mainly access control. The traditional Access Control List (ACL) cannot always be able to provide the desired level 
of security in large scale infrastructures. Many different access control techniques are available today, but Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) prevail. In the case of RBAC, access 
privileges are allocated to roles rather than to individual users. Therefore, RBAC has the advantage that it can 
significantly simplify the management of access controls for large numbers of users. 
ABAC, as a replacement for or adjunct to RBAC, performs decisions relying on attributes of requestors and 
resources, being more suitable for distributed systems. ABAC assigns attributes to users, which can be certified by 
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specific authorities and later verified against access control policies. ABAC uses labeled objects and user attributes 
instead of permissions to provide access control. We can say that a role in ABAC can be regarded as a group of 
mixed attributes rather than representing an unitary group of permissions as in RBAC. 
The Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) is a concept that manages user authorizations by using the ITU-T 
X.509 Attribute Certificates (ACs) This was introduced in the 2001 version of X.509, and in 2005 a delegation 
service was added to improve the PMI. In 2009, an interdomain authorization was also added to enhance the current 
version of PMI. 
Using an analogy, the concept of PMI with authorization mirrors the concept of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
with authentication. While PKI uses Public-Key Certificates (PKCs) to prove the identity of a certificate subject, 
PMI uses ACs to check and validate authorization data to a certificate subject for a given resource. 
However, PMI is rather a subcomponent of a PKI, because PMI still relies on PKI for validating signatures of the 
Attribute Authorities (AAs). Basically, PMI is used to provide the necessary framework to effectively make use of 
the attribute certificates for proper privilege authorizations. PKI and PMI infrastructures are related by information 
contained in the identity and attribute certificates. 
Based on PMI ACs, the paper proposes a new conceptual method that deals with deployment of a distributed 
repository suitable for validating the ACs by a requesting entity in a large scale networked infrastructure, where a 
PMI context is involved. 
2. PMI Model 
Although ACs were first defined in X.509(97), it was not until the 4th edition of X.509 (ISO 9594-8:2001) [3] 
that a full infrastructure for the use of attribute certificates was defined. This infrastructure is termed a Privilege 
Management Infrastructure (PMI), and it enables privileges to be allocated, delegated, revoked and withdrawn in an 
electronic way. A PMI is to authorization what a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to authentication [1]. 
PMI entails Sources of Authority (SoA) as trusted root and Attribute Authority (AA) as ACs’ issuer. They do not 
use Certification Authorities (CAs) like PKI does. However, there is a relationship between PKI and PMI, because 
the PMIs are based on PKIs, for example, when attribute certificates need to be digitally signed by the AA that 
issued them. At this point, when the signature of the AA needs to be verified, PKI is used. 
A PMI consists of 5 types of components [3]: 
• Attribute Authorities (AAs) (also called Attribute Certificate Issuer) - to issue and revoke ACs. 
• Attribute Certificate Users - to parse or process an AC. 
• Attribute Certificate Verifier - to check the validity of an AC and then make use of the result 
• Client - to request an action for which authorization checks are to be made 
• Repositories - to store and make available certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). 
An AC (or Authorization Certificate) is a digital document which contains attributes issued by the AA to a holder 
(which is the subject of the attribute certificate). When the attributes are used to provide authorization to a holder, 
that attribute certificate essentially becomes an authorization certificate. An AC does not contain a public key 
because the issuer of the AC has the Attribute Certificate Verifier under its control. No authentication is required 
here for the attribute certificate. The authentication is, however, verified with the public-key certificate. 
An AC references a public-key certificate which is the digital identity of the holder of both the public-key 
certificate and the attribute certificate. Further more, a role within an attribute certificate can be further delegated to 
other entities, effectively creating an AC chain, but this procedure is not recommended by RFC 3281 because of the 
complexity of chain processing and administration [2]. 
ACs may be used in a wide range of applications and environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability 
goals and a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements [2]. 
Fig. 1 describes the elements of PMI [4]. There are two types of attribute certificate distribution, push and pull 
[4]. In some environments it is suitable for a client to push an AC to a server. This means that no new connections 
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between the client and server are required. It also means that no search burden is imposed on servers, which 
improves performance [4]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Elements of PMI [4] 
In other cases, it is more suitable for a client simply to authenticate to the server and for the server to request or 
pull the client’s AC from an AC issuer or a repository. A major benefit of the pull model is that it can be 
implemented without changes to the client or to the client–server protocol. It is also more suitable for some inter–
domain cases where the client’s rights should be assigned within the server’s domain, rather than within the client’s 
domain [4]. 
An AC comprises a digitally signed SEQUENCE of [1]: 
• the version number of this AC (v1 or v2). 
• identification of the holder of this AC. 
• identification of the AA issuing this AC. 
• the identifier of the algorithm used to sign this AC 
• the unique serial number of this AC. 
• the validity period of this AC. 
• the sequence of attributes being bound to the holder. 
• any optional extensions. 
Table 1. presents a comprehensive comparison of PKI and PMI [1]. 
     Table 1. Comparison between PKI and PMI. 
Concept PKI entity PMI entity 
Certificate Public Key Certificate Attribute Certificate 
Certificate issuer Certification Authority Attribute Authority 
Certificate user Subject Holder 
Certificate binding Subject's Name to Public Key Holder's Name to 
Privilege Attribute(s) 
Revocation Certificate Revocation List Attribute Certificate 
Revocation List 
Root of trust Root CA or Trust Anchor Source of Authority 
Subordinate authority Subordinate CA Attribute Authority 
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Extensions to X.509 ACs are concerned with specifying some aspects of policy that govern the use and 
applicability of the ACs. The extensions can be split up into five categories [1]: 
• basic extensions. 
• privilege revocation extensions. 
• an extension to support roles. 
• source of authority extensions. 
• delegation of authority extensions. 
Details about X.509 AC Extensions are provided in [1]. 
3. Implementing a new distributed repository schema for X.509 Attribute Certificate 
A more efficient way to authenticate a client and check its privilege levels is to inspect its Authority Certificate 
(AC) via a repository, rather than accepting the AC pushed by the client. Security advantages behind this method 
can be summarized as follows: 
• The requesting entity which requests validation can interrogate a trustworthy database and not rely on any 
real or altered information pushed by the client. 
• Access to the repository may be secured, and the effectiveness increases if there is a proper standard way to 
interrogate these attribute certificates. 
• It simplifies the process of authorization because the user does not need to explicitly tell the requesting entity 
what are its privileges. The client can have its privileged looked-up in a database and automatically extract 
its privileges from there. 
If this method will become the dominant method for interrogating the privileges of a user, it means that the 
databases which hold these attribute certificates must be of considerable size and access to them must be of a top 
quality. In today's computer networking, only a distributed system can offer high volume transaction efficiency 
when serving thousands of requests per second. But the selection of specific technologies on distributed systems is 
covered by implementation details and it is not the subject of the paper. 
Fig. 2 shows the relationships between the AA, Distributed Repository, AC Holder and AC Verifier. 
 
 
Fig. 2 The new proposed Distributed Repository for x.509 Attribute Certificates 
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The proposed architecture components for integration of the ACs within a distributed repository are: 
• One or multiple SQL / Oracle databases across several servers with permanent replication system. 
• Separate authorization servers and credentials servers. 
• Several pre-cached permissions of users on response servers only (like the DNS cache system). 
The corresponding high-level workflows for interrogating an AC for a particular user would be: 
• The Client connects to the Server (which is also the validating entity). 
• The Server queries the Distributed Database for the AC of the connecting client, after verifying its Public-
Key Certificate. 
• The Distributed Database replies to the Server with the authorization credentials for that particular user. 
• The Server acknowledges and registers the Client's permissions.  
4. Conclusions 
The distributed repository represents a more efficient solution to store and access the attribute certificates for two 
main reasons: 
• The internal management of the ACs is more robust and more secure, because these ACs and their backups 
are distributed evenly on more systems, which causes redundancy, scalability and fault tolerance. 
• The external user, this “centralized” (which in fact, is a distributed) system of accessing the ACs directly 
from a trusted authority is more efficient than having the user present its AC. 
Despite the fact that maintaining a distributed repository involves more cost, more equipment dedicated for this 
purpose, more maintenance and workload, in the long run it offers a more reliable and trustworthy service, 
especially in this critical area of real-life digital security domain. The paper advances just a conceptual, theoretical 
PMI-based method that can provide the basis for building real technological solutions for implementing a distributed 
repository for X.509 ACs. 
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